Debates on the Ethical Status of Animals between Confucians, Catholics, and Buddhists

Abstract

This paper begins with Matteo Ricci’s (Li Madou 利瑪竇, 1551-1610) Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義 (True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) rebuttal of the Mengzi’s 孟子 argument that sparing the life of an ox one sees being led to slaughter is a proof of an innate moral disposition to compassion. It moves on to Shi Tongrong’s 釋通容 (1593-1661) Yuandao bixie shuo 原道闢邪說 (Tracing the Dao and refuting heterodoxy) and other Late Imperial Buddhist criticisms of Ricci, some of which argue that “rational” (or prosocial) actions on the part of various animals disprove the Aristotelian view of a “Ladder of Souls.” As one might expect, both positions are fraught with the kind of misunderstandings and mischaracterizations that are the hallmark of cross-cultural encounters. Yet, if we go back to the context of the original passage in the Mengzi, we see clear signs there was also a debate about the ethical treatment of non-human animals and the possibility of a “Ladder of Souls” in pre-imperial China. This shows how effectively the Mengzi’s parable captures a universal tension that grows out of a conflict between human cultural claims to exceptionality, and the lived recognition of shared qualities with non-human animals.

About the Speaker

Prof. Mark CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, Professor and Eliaser Chair of International Studies, has an AB in East Asian Languages and Civilizations (Harvard) and a PhD in Asian Languages (Stanford). He uses both excavated and transmitted texts to reconstruct the religions, philosophies, and cultures of early China. Recent books include Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China (2004) and Readings in Han Chinese Thought (2006). He is currently translating a set of Song dynasty essays on the Zhuangzi. He is Editor of the Journal of Chinese Religions.

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